Why The Wehrmacht Hated Fighting Alongside The SS

Comments · 1.3K

• BN

  @BNVodkaFPS · 7 months ago

  Their relationship is like construction engineer with architect 😂

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• GR

  @GritCortex · 7 months ago

  Professional soldiers who trained for years are more effective than poorly trained fanatics, shock!

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• KE

  @keeftaylor834 · 7 months ago

  "Incomplete German records" is code for captured by the Soviets.

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• KA

  @karstenerdinger2167 · 7 months ago

  the term Wehrmacht is misused. Wehrmacht means all of the armed forces, not just the regular Army. The Wehrmacht was the Heer, Luftwaffe, and Kriegsmarine put together. The SS was a paramilitary force under the auspices of the Heer

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• JA

  @jagdpanther42 · 7 months ago

  Decades of tradition, doctrine and discipline vs blind fanaticism <br>Even for any army in the world, it&apos;s a disgrace when your government prioritizes a militia over your country&apos;s actual army

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• IS

  @issakklinkkammer9489 · 7 months ago

  People seem to forget that some SS Divisions were elite, and some were bad, it really depends what divisions you talk about.

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• CA

  @Calventius · 7 months ago (edited)

  The Charlemagne fought well in Berlin. They traveled half way across Germany to defend Berlin.

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• SK

  @skylerbergeron7453 · 7 months ago

  33rd Charlemagne was a pretty tough unit

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• 55

  @55941ana · 7 months ago

  <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=zKzb-QHSqB0&amp;t=17">0:17</a> What is Mickey doing on tiger tank

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• ST

  @sthrich635 · 7 months ago

  Some slight inaccuracies and myth there. The whole Wehrmacht vs Waffen SS was mostly a post-war engineered myth to &quot;excuse&quot; German military failure to protect the Heer image during the rebuilding of NATO. In reality, with careful analysis of actual combat and unit data, the narrative of two service &quot;rivalry&quot; was far from a widespread truth. <br> <br>Firstly, there is a blatant mistake regarding the allocation of new German tanks and vehicles. The reality was completely opposite - almost every type of new German AFV went to Heer units first, then with a month or two gap, to Waffen SS. <br> <br>The first Tiger Is allocated was to a Heer heavy tank battalion, 502nd, for Leningrad sector in summer 1942. The first Tiger Is was only allocated to 1st SS division in winter 1942, several months later and after the allocation of Tigers to two more Heer units, the 501st and 503rd. <br>The first Panther tanks were allocated to Heer premier GD Panzergrenadier division for Battle of Kursk. Afterwards, it was equally distributed to Heer and SS Panzer regiments in a gradual manner - at no point there was any plan to fully equipped SS Panzer units with Panther tanks first before the Heer units. <br>For heavy tank destroyers, including Elefant, Nashorn, Jagdpanther, despite them having the most powerful AT cannon in the form of 88mm Pak 43, and highly useful in defensive war from 1943 onwards, the Waffen SS had ZERO heavy tank destroyer unit - Almost all of these powerful tank destroyers went to Heer schwere Panzerjager-Abteilungen. Same for Jagdtiger. <br>None of the Waffen SS Panzer division, including the 1st LSSAH, came close to the priority allocation of vehicles in elite Heer formations, namely the Grossedeutschland (which also had an organic Tiger unit) or Panzer Lehr (which had full allocation of 251 halftracks instead of trucks). <br>And this was not limited to tanks - The new MP43 assault rifles were first properly allocated to Heer 1st infantry division instead of Waffen SS, same as the Mkb42. <br> <br>Secondly, on the tactics between Wehrmacht Heer and Waffen SS <br>Just pointing out the slightly higher average casualties of Waffen SS as a whole and quickly attributed this to its &quot;fanaticism&quot; is missing the necessary objective analysis of this two organisation composition and context. <br>Waffen SS was not exactly organized the same as Wehrmacht Heer, in fact Waffen SS had a rather polarized composition - one part was well-equipped and trained Panzer and Panzergrenadier formations, and while they fought well in battles than average infantry divisions, the fact they were mobile units, an exception in mostly non-motorized German military, meant these SS Panzer and PzG divisions were often used as fire brigades to plug gaps and thrown into fierce battles at a higher frequency than regular non-motorized units, resulting in having to fight more battles and more enemies, and hence stacking up higher casualties. The other part was second or third rate foreign infantry formations with unimpressive firepower and equipment allocations, and sometimes unreliable conscripts - their weaker strength than average Heer infantry units meant they suffered higher casualties the same during late war defensive actions. While the Wehrmacht Heer also had mobile divisions and a fair share of second line poorly equipped troops, where their situations were similar, the Heer had a large number of regular non-motorized infantry divisions that on average faced less causalties in comparison. However, the Waffen SS had no such significant number of regular infantry divisions - hence nothing to &quot;statisically lower&quot; the rate of casualties unlike the Wehrmacht Heer. <br>On the other hand, the so called &quot;lack of professional training&quot; in Waffen SS, was again, a post war myth to shift blame. In reality, the head inspector of Waffen SS and its predecessor SSVT, was Paul Hausser, a geniune army general retired from Reichwehr after a length period of well-regarded service, including serving in General Staff, and earning numerous decorations. To say there was no professional oversight on Waffen SS was a myth. <br>Moreover, the Panzer personnel of Waffen SS Panzer divisions went to the same Heer-staffed Panzertruppenschule. The tank crews, NCOs, and officers were trained alongside with Heer counterparts. At the end, they were selected and graduated upon examination of the same professional Heer instructors who selected the Heer Panzer division personnel. <br>And lastly, there was frequent transfer of army leaders to Waffen SS units, which to be emphasized, was the same arrangement of transfers between different Heer formations to expand overall military forces, where newly promoted commanders sent to other units to take command. <br>Overall, the degree of professional combat training and experience was far from lacking in Waffen SS. Therefore, in terms of higher casualty rate in Waffen SS, the organization difference between two service served a much more reasonable explanation than the so called lack of professionalism or fanaticism. <br> <br>And lastly, the biggest and most blatant myth, was the artifical &quot;separation&quot; between Wehrmacht and Waffen SS, which was one of the main component of overall post-war &quot;clean Wehrmacht myth&quot; to shift the blame of not just military failure, but ideological crime as well. <br>To begin with, the notion of Wehrmacht served the nation, while Waffen SS severd the party and the dictator, as presented in this video, was frankly unture for the most part. Before the war, the Wehrmacht had already changed their oath to the &quot;Htler oath&quot;, swearing personal loyalty to the dictator. In the July 20 plot, in which the plotters were a very small circle of German resistance army members, and which even included members of SS and Police, were eventually put down not by the Waffen SS, but by the army loyalist troops themselves! Hmmler&apos;s fantasy that one day his &quot;more loyal&quot; Waffen SS would protect the party from &quot;unreliable&quot; Wehrmacht never came true, as ultimately the Wehrmacht proved itself for most part just as polictically reliable as the SS - Htler had done an effective job in transforming Wehrmacht into a political military, regardless how well the post-war army generals would admit - On Eastern Front Wehrmacht troops carried out same ideological instructions in cooperation with SS, and in mid-war and late war, much of the Wehrmacht officers in junior or mid level were Party members as well. <br>And just an extra note, the supposed &quot;separated&quot; command between Wehrmacht and Waffen SS actually worked in favor to Wehrmacht, and one reason that Htler (who was the supreme commander of Wehrmacht) agreed to such arrangement. By putting Waffen SS under Wehrmacht Heer operational command, Waffen SS divisions were just another army units to be commanded and fight on Wehrmacht&apos;s behalf. However, since Wehrmacht rightfully understood the SS influence and control on occupied nations&apos; economy and society, while Wehrmacht mostly limited themselves inside Germany proper, by leaving the administrative control to SS, this gave the SS responsibility to supply and recruit the SS divisions via their own sources first instead of competing the pool with Wehrmacht at the beginning - only when in mid-war, as the first few SS Panzer divisions proven themselves in combat, where they allocated Germany manpower pool - meanwhile other newer SS divisions still had to be formed via manpower SS themselves scrap up, including Volksdeutsche and foreign conscripts.

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• CA

  @cappyjack3070 · 7 months ago

  Sounds like the regular army learned lessons from WW1, the ss didn&apos;t exist then.

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• JU

  @justinlay4593 · 7 months ago

  &quot;If those Waffen-SS units and equipment were integrated into the Wehrmacht instead, would Germany have lasted six months longer?&quot; Perhaps, but then one or two or five of its cities would&apos;ve also been vaporized.

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