The 10 Biggest Mistakes at Gettysburg | Civil War History

Comments · 82

• WI

  @WinlinkDeepDive · 1 month ago · pinned

  Was Gettysburg lost by one mistake or a chain of them? What do you think?

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• DA

  @Davin64 · 1 month ago (edited)

  First, right from the start, Stuart was accomplishing what Lee had sent him to accomplish. Supplies and provisions from intercepting Union wagon trains, tearing up rail lines to deny resupply for Meade and probing around Harrisburg, which was Lee&apos;s objective. Furthermore, Stuart had left two brigades of cavalry with Lee to be his eyes. It was Lee who didn&apos;t use them, because he had a personal distrust of irregular cavalry. The entire episode was entirely Lee&apos;s fault, not Stuart&apos;s. Stuart was equipped with seven brigades. Two were guarding the supply lines from the Shenandoah Valley. Two were irregulars, which he left with Lee. Three he took with him on his scouting run. He left Beverly Robertson and Grumble Jones at the supply lines. Though they commanded regulars, they were both feuding with Stuart and Stuart couldn&apos;t rid himself of them because they were good cavalry commanders. So, Lee got the irregulars that Stuart couldn&apos;t use on the raids.<br><br>Secondly, under normal circumstances, Longstreet&apos;s advice to move around to the South of Meade and force a defensive engagement would be totally correct. Most people agree with Longstreet on this issue. However, the supply train from Virginia was coming up the Shenandoah Valley into Pennsylvania. To move south of Meade meant moving the supply train, which couldn&apos;t operate through the Union forces, so the alternative would have to be moving it through Union territory also garrisoned by Union forces in central Maryland. To do as Longstreet suggested meant moving the Army of Northern Virginia...out of supply and having 70,000 troops relying on forage and whatever Stuart could provide. Furthermore, the war had reached the turning point for the South. There was no possible way to match the output of Northern industry. The Federal army was now much larger than the South&apos;s and growing. So Gettysburg was the Confederacy&apos;s last chance to convince the North to give up. Lee was correct for staying to fight.<br><br>Lastly, even if Lee won at Gettysburg, it would have been at great loss, as well as the fact that he would have had to retreat to Virginia to re-supply anyway. Their operations totally depleted their artillery ammunition. And since their cast bronze artillery required &apos;ball&apos; type ammo, capturing Union ammo after the battle would be meaningless, since Union Parrott Rifle artillery used modern shells instead. And that established supply line was trickling ammunition to Lee. The ONLY thing they could hope for was to convince Lincoln to surrender following a victory. But then, a day later Vicksburg fell to Grant, opening up the Mississippi for northern farmers to trade with Europe. That victory raised morale so much in the North that the election results were 180 degrees from what was expected, and the Republicans took the landslide. So all this is moot. Lincoln literally went from goat to hero overnight.

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• RI

  @richardmccutcheon5800 · 1 month ago

  In a previous post, I had asked some of these same questions. Now, I see you have very eloquently answered them. Another well done video. Semper Fi!

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• MA

  @mariocampos1969 · 1 month ago

  Let&apos;s remember Lee repeated at Gettysburg the essentially same mistake he committed at Malvern Hill.

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• MA

  @MarkElzey-xk4kj · 1 month ago

  The artillery barrage prior to Picketts assault was mishandled. &nbsp;Ewell and/or Alexander had a unique opportunity to enhance the barrage by placing more guns north of cemetery hill to fire southward lengthwise down the Union line. &nbsp;One battalion of 18 guns did do this and the effect was astonishing since each shot was bound to hit Union gun emplacements or troops as the shells travelled lengthwise down the Union line. &nbsp;Both Hancock and Howard commented on the accurate and dangerous fire coming from Gettysburg. &nbsp;But it was too light to have great effect. &nbsp;What Ewell or Alexander overlooked was setting up this crossfire with 50-60 guns firing southward to compliment the gunline of 140 guns firing eastward from Seminary ridge.

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• MA

  @mariocampos1969 · 1 month ago

  Quickly pursuing the Lee further to the battle was a logistical impossibility. Most of the animals were not fed for 3 days and had no conditions to pull the artillery and ammunition wagons. The men were also on meager rations.

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• GA

  @garywalker2848 · 1 month ago (edited)

  Jackson wasn’t a “one man army,” but many don&apos;t appreciate that he was the piece that made Lee’s whole system work. Until Gettysburg Lee, Jackson, and Stuart operated as a single tactical engine — fast, coordinated, and aggressive enough to win battles they had no business winning. Their strength wasn’t mythology; it was tempo, surprise, and the ability to strike hard even when outnumbered. <br> <br>Jackson kept Lee’s intent moving, kept Stuart tied in, and kept the army acting as one organism. That’s why Lee could fight above his weight class to win battles, compared to the strength of Grant and Sherman who focused on grand strategy and logistics to win the war. The Confederacy’s battlefield success came from tactical brilliance — and not the only contribution to the loss but Jackson was the main catalyst for it missing at Gettysburg. <br> <br>When Jackson fell, that entire offensive system vanished. Longstreet remained dependable, but the rapid, coordinated, strike first style that defined Lee’s army disappeared. Without Jackson, Stuart’s integration faltered, Lee’s reconnaissance dried up, and the Army of Northern Virginia lost the very mechanism that had made its victories possible.

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• BO

  @bobrussell4957 · 1 month ago

  Ewell&apos;s decision that taking Culp&apos;s Hill wasn&apos;t practicable is criticized as though if he had tried, he would have and thereby vindicated the &quot;immortal&quot; R E Lee, but in essence Ewell&apos;s deciding not to try must have been spot on, because there was nothing the confederates could do- even when the hill was being held with only 1 brigade- to take that position.

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• SA

  @Samuel-o7j2f · 1 month ago

  Winlink, a question, have you ever played Sierra&apos;s &quot;Civil War Generals II?&quot; &nbsp;It has a number of Gettys. scenarios that feature different &quot;what ifs.&quot; &nbsp;I&apos;ve played probably over 1000 Gettys. scenarios and even created a bunch just for myself, and it becomes apparent that the South was up against too many Union troops. &nbsp;Time, location, and manpower were all on the Union side.

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• SA

  @Samuel-o7j2f · 1 month ago

  If you watch Tim Smith&apos;s video&apos;s you&apos;ll gain some great insight. &nbsp;I remember him scoffing at the McLaws-Hood-Longstreet suggestion that the south swing around the union&apos;s left and strike them there. &nbsp;Smith mentioned that aside from the logistical problems, the 6th corps, (8 large brigades), was coming up near that area.

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• NI

  @Nigelrathbone1 · 1 month ago (edited)

  Some say Union commander of the 3rd Corps General Dan Sickles may have unwittingly delayed/foiled Longstreet&apos;s 2nd day &nbsp;&quot;en echelon&quot; advance by repositioning his corps forward, against his orders to hold his position on the low ground of the &quot;fishhook&quot;, to the middle of the battlefield at the Peach Orchard.

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• FR

  @fredsmith8498 · 1 month ago

  Gettysburg was lost because no one consulted Private Culp, aGettysberg native fighting for Virginia. &nbsp;He would have correctly guided McLaws and Hoods Division to RoundTop at least 2 hours earlier. &nbsp;They then could get in the rear of the Federals and routed them

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