Gödel's Argument for God

Comments · 1K

• GE

  @gerrycoogan6544 · 2 years ago

  This has made me question the existence of  Gödel.

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• EL

  @ElmahiraJusuf · 12 days ago

  As a philosophy major who usually struggles to find this kind of clarity in classes, your video made it refreshingly easy and fun to understand.

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• TH

  @TheChristianFilmmaker · 4 years ago

  Been looking forward to this! Thanks!

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• EL

  @elidrissii · 4 years ago

  Beautiful. Gödel's elegant and simple ontological argument is really underrated. Thank you professor.

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• NJ

  @njvalueinvestor · 2 years ago

  Thank you Dr. For sharing.

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• US

  @user-js8ud3ub9p · 4 years ago

  thank you, daniel. I've been researching this recently and your video cleared up some confusion I was having! cheers, friend.

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• SP

  @spherexxx44 · 2 years ago

  Thank you, and God Bless you, I needed that light through dark times.

• RA

  @ravivaradhan4956 · 4 years ago

  Thank you for this video that sharpens the arguments of Anselm and Descartes using the powerful logic of Godel.  I would greatly appreciate if you can comment on Nagarjuna's Tetralemma and whether that is a refutation of the logic of Anselm/Dscartes/Godel.

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• KR

  @krx3070 · 2 years ago

  The outdoor setting is really good

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• DI

  @DianelosGeorgoudis · 4 years ago

  As the video demonstrates the power of Godel’s argument hangs on the meaning of modal language. <br><br>The only way I can make sense of modal language in the context of metaphysical philosophy is this: There is the actual reality in which we live and which has a particular nature. Given that nature there are many ways reality could have been but isn’t (or in other words many facts of the actual reality are contingent). Let us call the set of all realities that could have been the “set of metaphysically possible worlds”. Then we define that “X is metaphysically possible” iff X obtains in at least one element of the set of metaphysically possible worlds”, and we define that “X is metaphysically necessary” iff X obtains in all elements of the set of metaphysically possible worlds.<br><br>But then the expression “X is necessarily possible” (or, to be precise, “it is metaphysically necessary that X is metaphysically possible” turns out to be meaningless, for there are no different kinds of metaphysical possibility. Either X does obtain in some element of the set of metaphysically possible worlds or it doesn’t. If it does then in it is metaphysically possible simpliciter. If it doesn’t then it is not metaphysically possible. Thus to speak of “necessary possibility” as if it were something distinct is to speak nonsense, and to use that non-existing distinction in an argument is to build on thin air.<br><br>I suspect that Godel’s error is to uncritically apply modal logic to metaphysical reasoning. In the realm of logic perhaps it makes sense to speak of X being necessarily possible, but that’s irrelevant to the practical business of metaphysical philosophy. After all it is not like one can map the set of all logically possible worlds to the set of all metaphysically possible worlds. So, for example, the set of all logically possible worlds (that is in the set of all internally logically consistent realities) there are some worlds which are theistic and some that aren’t. For example a by definition logically possible world is the empty world in which nothing exists, which is a non theistic world. But it is easy to prove (see Plantinga) that if it is metaphysically possible that theism is true then it it metaphysically necessary that it is true. Or, applying my meaning of modal language, if theism is true in one metaphysically possible world then it is true in all of them. One can see why this is so without actually following Plantinga’s proof: Theism is a claim about the very nature of reality. If the nature of reality is theistic then all ways reality could have been will be theistic also (it’s not like the nature of reality is a contingent fact or that God might remove himself from reality). Incidentally for the same reason Plantinga’s result can be turned on its head: If it is metaphysically possible that theism is false then it it metaphysically necessary that it is false.

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• RA

  @rareword · 4 years ago

  When listening to philosophers, and thinkers in general, one realizes how difficult it is to take nothing for granted,

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• WA

  @wayoutdan8334 · 4 years ago

  I&apos;ve been looking for this!

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